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The melting-pot and the economic integration of immigrant 
families: ancestral and generational variations in Australia 
 
 
Abstract. The melting pot argument, whereby economically heterogeneous multi-cultural 
societies, characterised by high levels of immigration from a variety of origins, become more 
homogeneous over time, has attracted much attention, especially in North America. Australia 
has similarly experienced major waves of immigration from a wide range of cultural 
backgrounds. This paper reports successful tests of hypotheses, derived from the melting-pot 
model, that economic integration of immigrant groups there has also resulted in reduced 
inter-group occupational and income differences across successive generations, but that the 
pace of integration can vary across ethnic groups. Using a bespoke tabulation from the 2011 
Australian census we explore differences among ten immigrant (ancestry) groups in their 
educational qualifications, and their occupational and income distributions, using a recently-
developed method to identify significant patterns within large contingency tables. We find 
that by the third generation there were no substantial differences either across the ten groups 
chosen to represent four main waves of immigration to Australia or between these groups and 
the non-immigrant population. 
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Introduction 
 
Immigrants have become increasingly important to developed-nation labour markets since 
World War II, with their economic (structural) integration into the receiving countries’ 
workforces seen as an important indicator of a successful immigration policy. Particular 
attention has focused on inter-generational economic mobility (as in special issues of The 
B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 2007(2) and Ethnic and Racial Studies, 
2010(7)), linked to educational achievement (Schneider and Crul, 2010, 1145).  To this, Boyd 
(2002) added a need to take account in both national and cross-national research of country-
specific differences in immigration histories associated with assimilation outcomes.    
 
Most studies of economic integration – implicitly if not explicitly – are set in the context of 
the ‘melting-pot model’ long used to characterise changes in United States’ society over more 
than two centuries of immigration from a wide range of ethnic backgrounds. As Borjas (1992, 
123) expressed it, the model claims that ‘over time, the children and grandchildren of 
immigrants moved out of ethnic enclaves, discarded their social and cultural background, and 
experienced economic mobility’. But many studies, such as Glazer and Moynihan’s (1963) 
classic Beyond the Melting Pot, challenged that interpretation, showing that some groups 
discarded their social and cultural backgrounds more readily and rapidly than others, and that 
the pace of economic mobility varied considerably among the country’s many ethnic groups. 
An alternative model – segmented assimilation (Portes and Zhou, 1993) – was formulated. In 
this, whereas the linear model of economic integration associated with social and cultural 
assimilation was followed by some groups, others retained their cultural values and 
developed their own ‘ethnic enclave economies’ separate from, yet integrated with, the wider 
economy. Yet other groups, through various forms of disadvantage and discrimination, 
experienced what Boyd (2002, 1038) terms ‘truncated assimilation’, with much less 
movement towards a situation – as seen in their educational qualifications, occupational 
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structures, and incomes – comparable to that of the host society. Boyd (2002), however, has 
argued that this segmented assimilation model is not in accordance with the Canadian 
situation, where economic integration has been the norm across all minority groups. 
 
Has that been the case in Australia too, a country that has experienced very substantial 
immigration from a wide range of sources encompassing varied social and cultural 
backgrounds over recent decades? With regard to economic integration, have members of all 
of those immigrant groups and, especially, their successor generations (the children and 
grandchildren of immigrant families) been equally successful, or some more successful than 
others in gaining qualifications, obtaining jobs and earning incomes that mean their situations 
are not distinguishable from those of the host population? Has Australia, like Canada, 
conformed to the melting-pot model, or is the situation there, as in the United States, better 
represented by either or both of the segmented and truncated assimilation models? 
 
There is evidence in the literature of considerable variation within immigrant-receiving 
countries relating to the cultural (ethnic) background mix of immigrants which Crul and 
Vermeulen (2003, 983) and Borjas (1993) suggested played a part in integration outcomes.  
As Khoo et al. (2002) found for Australia, Boyd (2002) for Canada, and Portes and MacLeod 
(1996) for the United States, while socioeconomic outcomes (occupational and educational 
attainment) of the second generation as a whole were better than for their non-immigrant 
peers, there was considerable diversity of outcomes by parents’ country of origin.  
Recognising this, Borjas (1992) had earlier introduced the concept of ‘ethnic capital’: 
intergenerational labour market outcomes in the second and subsequent generations depend 
on different ethnic environments, such as differences in attitudes to education, which is an 
important influence on economic performance.  As a consequence, those from markedly 
different backgrounds from the receiving society may take longer to integrate and achieve the 
levels of social and economic mobility attained by those who differ less.  Two hypotheses 
derived from Borjas’ (1992, 1993) work are relevant to the study of Australian migrants and 
their descendants undertaken here:   
1. That regardless of where the parents and/or grandparents come from, 
intergenerational achievement will result in succeeding generations moving closer to 
the general population average in, for example, income levels (Borjas – 1993, p.133– 
terms this ‘regression toward the mean across generations’); but  
2. That inter-generational movement towards economic integration may not occur 
evenly (i.e. at the same rate) across ethnic groups.  
 
We evaluate those hypotheses here with data for Australia, one of several dominantly 
English-speaking countries that has experienced growing ethnic diversity over the last half-
century through substantial migration streams from a range of – mainly European and Asian 
– origins. The flexibility of access to Australian census data allows the creation of bespoke 
tabulations of individuals’ ancestry – by generation and age – with their labour market 
situations, facilitating direct tests of the hypotheses regarding convergence of those situations 
across the generations, although potentially at differential rates. 
 
Successful intergenerational integration is especially important in Australia, where 
immigrants are regarded as pivotal to shaping the nation’s economy because of their post-
World War II impact on the size and composition of the population and labour force (ABS, 
2007).  The 2014 International Migration Outlook report (OECD, 2014) shows that 27.3 per 
cent of all Australians were born overseas, compared with 24.1 per cent in New Zealand, 19.8 
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per cent in Canada, 13 per cent in the US, and 1.9 per cent in Britain; 25 per cent of 
Australians by ancestry are from non-English speaking backgrounds. 
 
Nevertheless, the intergenerational integration of immigrant groups is relatively under-
researched in the Australian context.  As recently as two decades ago, Vasta (1994, 21) noted 
that concern with Australia’s second generation of immigrant parents was relatively recent 
(cf. Khoo et al. 2002).  Two decades later, Sweetman and van Ours (2014) extended the 
debate, identifying a need to document the economic integration patterns of immigrants, their 
children and grandchildren within countries and to compare such outcomes across nations as 
members of the third generation of those claiming an immigrant ancestry complete their 
schooling and enter the workforce.  We address this gap with Australian data, as a 
contribution to greater understanding of inter-generational trends of economic integration. 
 
Research framework 
 
Boyd (2002, 1038) refers to the American integration literature identifying two possible 
outcomes for immigrant offspring of relevance here.  One, a linear integration model, 
suggests that after two or three generations immigrants’ descendants approximate closely to 
the occupational and income structures of the host society.  According to this model, 
immigrants’ grandchildren (born in the country of parents also born in the country – the third-
plus generation) out-perform the children of immigrant parents (the second generation) who 
in turn out-perform the first-generation immigrants themselves.  The second model embraces 
socioeconomic disadvantage, especially among those who are socially and/or culturally most 
distant from the host or receiving society, referred to in the American literature as ‘segmented 
assimilation’ (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Zhou, 1997).  This scenario is sometimes seen to date 
from the relaxation of immigration policies relating to the exclusion of what became known 
in Canada as ‘visible minorities’; such relaxation occurred in the United States in the mid-
1960s, in Canada between 1962 and 1967, in Australia (the demise of the ‘White Australia’ 
policy) in the early 1970s, and in New Zealand in the mid-1980s.   
 
These changes to the racial and ethnic composition of immigrant flows to those countries 
emphasised ethnic differences and potential discrimination based on social distance and 
issues of national identity (Forrest and Dunn, 2006).  But in the absence of the special 
circumstances relating to America’s immigration history, in particular the presence there of a 
large ‘involuntary minority’ comprising a highly disadvantaged and racially identified 
underclass of Black Americans (Boyd, 2002, 1043), Boyd and Grieco (1998) found that the 
linear model of integration best reflected the distinction in Canada between visible minorities 
and the rest of the population.  In terms of educational attainment, Boyd (2002) similarly 
found greater achievement (compared with the first or immigrant generation) in the second 
generation, but decline (under-achievement) in the third generation.  Evidence suggests that 
the Australian experience largely reflects Canada’s (Forrest and Dunn, 2006, 205-210) with 
the linear model of intergenerational integration applying in both cases.  This would be 
subject, however, to either any disadvantage suffered by particular ancestral  groups 
associated with ethnic discrimination in a post-White Australian, ‘multicultural’ society 
(Forrest and Dunn, 2010) or the presence of any Australian immigrant underclass as 
suggested by Khoo et al. (2002, 143-144).    
 
Post-1945 migrant cohorts settled in Australia under two quite different sets of economic 
conditions and policy settings (Forrest et al., 2006): an industrial economy during an 
extended period of economic boom during the 1950s and 1960s; and a service economy 
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emphasising skilled (white collar) employment during a period of alternating boom and 
recession starting a decade later.  Examination of occupational backgrounds of first-
generation immigrants during the industrial period led Collins (1978) to suggest the 
development of two main labour force segments: those from either northwestern Europe or 
English-speaking backgrounds focusing on white-collar jobs; and mainly manual occupations 
among those from southern Europe – semi-skilled (processing and production) and unskilled 
occupations associated with low levels of educational attainment.  There is descriptive 
evidence, however, that such segmentation had no lasting effect: the proportion with tertiary 
qualifications was substantially higher among the second generation of immigrants from 
southern and eastern Europe, with much higher proportions in professional occupations than 
in the first (immigrant) generation, compared with the Australian-born (Khoo et al., 2002, 53-
55).   
 
The post-1970s decades, on the other hand, were a period of economic restructuring and 
adjustment to new forces of global competition, interspersed with short periods of recession, 
during which Australia’s migration policy settings were transformed in several ways.  The 
first was the result of the ending in the 1970s of the ‘White Australia’ policy whereby people 
of ‘colour’ were barred from entering the country.  Australia was opened up to people from 
anywhere in the world, subject only to policy settings regarding needed qualifications and 
skills.   The second reflected the new emphasis on immigrants with skills, especially 
professional and para-professional qualifications, during the 1980s and 1990s.  Finally, in the 
face of persistently inferior labour market outcomes among professionals from non-English-
speaking-background source countries, there was a move from about 2000 to ‘select for 
success’ (Hawthorne, 2005) by redefining acceptable levels of human capital in terms of 
‘minimum threshold standards’ for ‘core employability factors of skill, age and English 
language ability’ (DIMA, 1999, 12), irrespective of ethnic background.  
 
Given those particular features of Australia’s changing labour markets and immigration 
flows, the following sections analyse data from the most recent (2011) census. This provides 
information on educational attainment, occupation and income for all adults as well as their 
reported ancestry, and – as detailed below – a particular facility available on the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) website allows bespoke cross-tabulations of those variables to be 
obtained for the entire population. The next section describes those data, and is followed by 
one introducing the methodology deployed for their analysis to test the hypotheses set out in 
the introduction. 
 
Data 
 
The goal in this study was to explore whether there are substantial (and statistically 
significant) differences across generations within a range of Australian immigrant groups and 
their successors in their degree of economic integration. For that – as used to be the case with 
US data (employed in Borjas, 1993) and continues to be in Canada (Boyd, 2002) – we use 
information from census questions that asked respondents to identify their ancestry (i.e. 
where they and their parents were born). These data allow direct comparison between 
generations within and across such ancestral groups as well as between those groups and 
those who identify as having Australian ancestry, commonly associated with Anglo cultural 
backgrounds (Forrest and Dunn, 2006). Further, a flexible feature of the Australian census 
has allowed us to produce a customised data set derived directly from the totality of the 
original, individual returns so that there is no problem of ecological inference (see also 
Subramanian et al. 2009). 
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The data were assembled using the 2011 Australian census Tablebuilder facility.1 The 
individuals included in these customised tables are all those aged between 20 and 69 who 
were in the workforce – either employed or unemployed and seeking work; students, 
homemakers, carers and those who had either retired from work or left the labour force for 
other reasons (such as health) are excluded. Data were obtained for members of several of the 
country’s main ancestral groups only, selected to exemplify its major recent immigrant flows. 
Census respondents were asked to nominate their ancestry and place of birth (including their 
parents’). Members of each of the ancestry groups identified were classified into: first 
generation – parents and respondent all born outside Australia; second generation – 
respondent born in Australia to both parents who were born outside Australia; third and 
subsequent generations – respondent and both parents born in Australia, but, as with the 
second generation, with a claimed ancestry associated with one of the ten groups. Following a 
suggestion by Khoo et al. (2002, 12-13), they were also classified by age groups – 20-29; 30-
49; and 50-69.  This partly takes into account different age distributions in the second 
generation relating to their parents’ group migration history, and partly makes some 
allowance for the small numbers among those aged 30 and over for major groups who had 
migrated to Australia since the early 1970s. 
 
The ten ancestral groups selected for study were chosen as representatives of Australia’s 
various immigrant waves: 
 Wave 1: immigrants from the United Kingdom and Ireland. These two groups 
predominated in the pre-1945 migrant streams and still remain among the top 
countries by birth of immigrants (Ho and Jakubowicz, 2013, 4). 
 Wave 2: immigrants from Greece, Italy and a first stream from the Former 
Yugoslavia. With the industrial boom that followed the Second World War substantial 
numbers of immigrants from these countries were attracted to occupy vacancies in the 
labour market that those from the UK and Ireland were no longer filling (Price, 1963). 
 Wave 3: immigrants from Asia, especially China and India. The ‘White Australia’ 
policy prevented migration from Asian countries until the early 1970s, when this ban 
was removed and increasing numbers were recruited, many of them to work in the 
expanding service sector (Forrest et al, 2014). 
 Wave 4: concurrently with those from Wave 3, immigrants – many of them refugees – 
from Lebanon in the mid-1970s (mainly Christians) and, in a later period, Muslims 
plus a second stream arising from the breakup of the Former Yugoslavia, similarly 
comprising both Christians and Muslims.2 Conflict in those two countries encouraged 
many to move to Australia, which operated a separate scheme for refugees and their 
dependants from that which regulated the Wave 3 migrants (whose access was 
governed according to their skills and other criteria relative to the country’s current 
labour demand). However, many of the refugees were, like the skilled immigrants, 
also well-educated (Forrest et al., 2013).  Each group was subdivided here into those 
with Christian and Muslim religious affiliations, though there were very few in the 
oldest age group (50-69) for the third generation. 
 
                                                          
1 For details on the Tablebuilder facility see http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome. 
nsf/home/tablebuilder – accessed 23 June 2015. 
2 A third major refugee group – from Vietnam in the late 1970s – could not be separately 
analysed here because many of them claimed Chinese ancestry. 
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That the ten groups represent different immigration waves and streams is clearly illustrated 
by Table 1, which shows the percentage of each immigrant group in each generation and each 
age group, as well as the total number in the relevant age groups and labour force. Those 
from the UK and Ireland were predominantly third-generation settlers, with the largest 
percentages in the oldest age group. Most Greeks and Italians enumerated in the 2011 census 
were second-generation Australians, and the majority were aged 30-49, whereas most of the 
Chinese and Indians were of the first-generation, with twice as many young adults as the 
previous two groups. Immigrants from Lebanon and the Former Yugoslavia were more 
varied, although the modal generation was the first. Inclusion of several groups of recent 
migrants means that they have few third-generation members – and in some cases not many 
second-generation members either. However, because of a major feature of the adopted 
method, as described below (the downweighting of the estimated rates where small numbers 
are involved), this does not produce major analytical problems, enabling us to explore 
whether there are significant differences in situations where the population is relatively small. 
 
These data gave a core matrix comprising ten ancestry groups, by three generations, by three 
age groups: 90 cells in all. Three further sets of information were added in turn to this core 
matrix, producing three large matrices that were separately analysed: 
 Each individual’s highest educational qualification in three categories: those who left 
school at the minimum leaving age; those who stayed at school for a further two years 
to obtain their Higher School Certificate (or its equivalent); and those who obtained a 
Tertiary education qualification, comprising a degree or Advanced Certificate.3 This 
gave final matrix of 10 x 3 x 3 x 3, with 270 cells; 
 Each individual’s occupation, in four categories – professional and managerial; 
clerical, sales and other white collar service occupations; technical and other skilled 
blue-collar occupations; and semi- and un-skilled blue-collar occupations – plus a 
fifth category for those who were unemployed. This gave a 10 x 3 x 3 x 5 final matrix, 
with 450 cells. 
 Each individual’s weekly income, in five categories – A$200-399; A$400-799; 
A$800-1,249; A$1,250-1,999; A$2000< – giving a further 450-cell matrix. 
 
Methodology 
 
Many analyses of intergenerational data, especially of human capital effects such as 
educational attainment or economic capital effects like occupation or income, are either 
descriptive (e.g. Khoo et al., 2002), or use a multiple regression framework.  Among the 
latter, however, many focus on independent variables as main effects only.  Examples in the 
context of intergenerational change are the regression analyses by Boyd (2002) of educational 
attainment and Hammarstedt (2009) of income differentials.  Few of these studies, if any, 
also explore the interaction terms involving two or more of those main effects, partly because 
sample sizes are too small. They thus fail to investigate any evidence of intra-group 
heterogeneity – of variations between generations within a single age group, for example.  
Yet ‘most social scientists would probably agree that the assumption of constant effects 
embedded in main effects is theoretically implausible’ (Elwert and Winship, 2010, 328) and 
                                                          
3 These data were collated from two separate tables via the Tablebuilder facility; it was not 
possible to identify separately those who gained a Year-12 qualification but did not proceed 
to a tertiary-level qualification. 
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Noted American statistician Andrew Gelman argues that ‘treatment interactions and subgroup 
analysis are important, but they should be estimated using multilevel models’.4  
 
A recently-developed approach using multi-level modelling of large contingency tables is 
thus adopted here for analysis of intergenerational variations, by age and ancestry group, in 
occupations and incomes.   (The method is set out in full detail in Jones et al., 2015.) 
Standard procedures – such as multiple regression with the percentage of each 
age/generation/immigrant group in each occupational or income category as the dependent 
variable and those three sets of groups as the independent variables – are not feasible because 
of the closed number set problem,5 plus the difficulty of identifying interactions among the 
independent variables. Hence the development of a procedure which assesses whether the 
number of individuals in each cell of a contingency table (e.g. the two 450-cell tables 
described above) is significantly larger or smaller than would be expected if there were no 
variation across cells – for example, if the proportion of individuals in each generational, age 
and ancestry group in a given occupational category is invariant.  
 
The method derives an expected value for each cell (i.e. assuming that the proportion of 
individuals in a given occupation for each generation and age-group cell of the contingency 
table for a particular ancestry group is the same as for that cell across all ancestry groups). It 
then takes the ratio of the observed to expected values, and models the logged ratios to derive 
credible intervals around the estimated ratio. This uses a multi-level modelling strategy with 
Full Bayesian estimates, based on work on disease incidence rates which may be unstable 
because of either or both of small observed and expected values (Clayton and Kaldor, 1987). 
The modelled estimates of the (logged) rates are automatically downweighted towards no 
effect of the observed being equal to the expected when they are based on small absolute 
numbers and the analysis is thereby protected from the over-interpretation of unreliable 
effects; distinctively high or low relative rates based on reliable evidence are not 
downweighted. All estimates are accompanied by their Bayesian credible (confidence) 
intervals (Jones et al., 2015). Importantly, the model is equivalent to the fully-saturated one 
and thus takes into account all of the multi-way interactions among the independent variables 
(in this case age, generation and ancestry). 
 
For each cell in the contingency table, therefore, we have an observed and expected value, the 
logged estimate of the ratio between those two,6 and the low and high credible (confidence) 
intervals (CIs) around that ratio – calculated as 1.95 of the standard error. A logged ratio 
estimate of 0.0 indicates that the observed number of observations in the cell is the same as 
the expected number; a negative estimate indicates that the observed number is less than the 
expected, and a positive ratio indicates more observed than expected. With those estimates 
we can establish (in line with our two hypotheses): 
 Whether any logged ratio is significantly different from zero (i.e. the ratio and its CIs 
are either all positive or all negative so that the spread of values does not incorporate 
                                                          
4 http://andrewgelman.com/2011/01/07/small_world_mit/ – accessed 23 June 2015. 
5 Because the percentages sum to 100 the dependent variables are not independent of each 
other and their standard errors will be correlated. Alternative procedures, such as seemingly 
unrelated regression, can tackle that issue, but not that associated with interactions. 
6 The natural log is used to better satisfy the Normality assumption that is used to specify the 
random effects model that underlies the analysis of the table. It also means that the modelled 
predicted counts of the table can never be estimated to be negative values on the raw scale. 
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zero), indicating that there are either more or fewer individuals in that cell than 
expected at the chosen significance level (0.05 or better); and 
 Whether any logged ratio is significantly different from any other (i.e. that the two 
ratios’ CIs do not overlap). 
For each of the 450-cell matrices, therefore, we have an estimate of whether the observed 
number in each cell (of second-generation Greeks aged 20-29 with incomes of A$200-399, 
for example) is significantly different from the expected number (if Greeks of that age group 
and generation had the same proportion in that income group as all of the other ancestral 
groups). 
 
Table 2 illustrates this with two examples taken from the ratios in the occupational 
distribution contingency table. For the first of the above questions – whether groups have 
logged observed:expected ratios significantly different from zero – we use the example of 
second-generation immigrants aged 20-29 in the managerial and professional occupations. 
The first eight coefficients in the upper block of the table are all negative and significantly 
different from zero (because their High CI values are also less than zero): the two 
significantly positive coefficients indicate that only young, second-generation immigrants 
from India and China had more individuals in the higher status occupations than would be the 
case if there were no generational and age differences in the occupational distribution. In the 
second example (first-generation immigrants aged 30-49 in the semi- and un-skilled 
occupations) three of the coefficients are significantly negative – those of Irish, UK or 
Chinese ancestry have fewer in that occupational group than expected – whereas a further six 
are significantly positive. Individuals in that generation and age group from India and Greece, 
plus the two groups from each of Lebanon and the Former Yugoslavia, are more likely to be 
in semi- and un-skilled occupations than expected. 
 
Regarding the second question – whether there are significant differences between any pair of 
immigrant groups, holding generation and age constant – the ordering of the ten ancestry 
groups in the table allows an assessment of whether each has a ratio significantly different 
from its nearest neighbour. The ratios are organised from the largest negative to the largest 
positive value; whether there is a significant difference between any ratio and that for the 
group above it in the rank-ordering is shown in the final column (Y indicating a significant 
and N an insignificant difference). Thus there is no significant difference between Yugoslav 
and Lebanese Muslims (upper panel), for example, because the CIs for the latter overlap 
those of the former; the LowCI for Lebanese Muslims (-0.53) is a larger negative number 
than the HighCI (-0.34) for Yugoslav Muslims. But there is no overlap between the next pair 
so the ratio for UK immigrants is significantly different from that for Lebanese Muslims. 
Overall, there are four significant breaks in that sequence: as well as that between Lebanese 
Muslims and those from the UK there are also significant differences between UK and 
Yugoslav Christian immigrants, between Greek and Indian, and between Indian and Chinese 
in their ratios of observed to expected numbers in that occupational group. The second 
example (lower panel) – for first-generation individuals aged 30-49 in semi- and un-skilled 
occupations – contains seven significant breaks: most of the groups, in the given order, have 
more individuals than expected in those occupations than the group immediately above them 
in the rank ordering. These significant differences suggest clear variations in the pace of 
economic integration across the ten groups, therefore; the melting pot process was operating 
more rapidly for some groups – notably those from the UK and Ireland whose cultural and 
social backgrounds were similar to those of earlier settlers – than for groups, especially those 
from Lebanon and the former Yugoslavia, with very different backgrounds. 
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As specified earlier, our main interest in these analyses is whether there are significant inter- 
and intra-generational differences among the ancestry groups in their occupational and 
income distributions which would be indicative of greater (more rapid) economic integration 
of some groups than others into Australian society. But such analyses need to take 
generational and age distributions into account because Table 1 showed substantial 
differences among the ten groups in these: those with UK ancestry should have more in the 
higher status occupations and earning the higher incomes because more of them are in the 
third generation than, say, those with Indian ancestry. In subsequent sections, therefore, we 
look first at generational and age distributions before turning to any differences between 
ancestry groups. Before that, however, we briefly examine whether there are significant 
differences across the ancestry groups – holding age and generation constant – in their 
educational achievements, for which the multi-level approach is not relevant because the age 
groups analysed vary according to the qualification. 
 
Differences in human capital 
One reason why different ancestry groups may vary in their levels of economic integration – 
their occupational and income distributions – may be because they differ in their human 
capital, indexed here by their educational qualifications. If members of some groups, holding 
constant their age and generation, have lower qualifications on average than other groups 
then their occupational and income attainment levels may vary accordingly. To inquire 
whether this was so, we analyse three achievement levels: 
 The percentage whose educational qualifications ended at the minimum school-
leaving age, for which the denominator is all those aged 20-69 (by age 20 everybody 
would have completed their high school education); 
 The percentage whose educational trajectories proceeded to the Australian Higher 
School Certificate (HSC) or its equivalent, normally taken two years after the 
minimum school-leaving age, for which the denominator is also all those aged  20-69; 
and 
 The percentage with tertiary qualifications (a Degree or Advanced Certificate), for 
which the denominator is all those aged 25-69 (assuming that all – other than mature 
students – will have obtained a first degree by the age of 25). 
 
To test for variations in qualification levels associated with generation, age and ancestry 
stepwise ordinary least squares multiple regression models were tested for each of those three 
dependent variables: the data refer to all those in the indicated age groups.  The first model 
included dummy variables for generation (contrasting those of the second and third 
generations with the first) and age group (contrasting those aged 30-49 and 50-69 with those 
aged 20-39); the second added a series of dummy variables for nine of the ancestry groups, 
contrasting them with the largest – those with UK ancestry (Table 3). 
 
By generation, the main differences are with the lowest qualification level – those who left 
school at the earliest possible age.  Second-generation immigrants were significantly more 
likely than those of the first generation to have these minimal qualifications only, and those in 
the third generation were even more so (by some 5 percentage points in the former case, and 
13 in the latter).7 Those who had been in Australia longest were much more likely to have the 
                                                          
7 A 2 standard error test indicates that the confidence intervals for the two coefficients at both 
steps (e.g. 4.9 for second generation and 13.1 for third generation at the first step) do not 
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minimum educational standards than were recent arrivals, suggesting difficulties (especially 
for those from very different cultural backgrounds and unfamiliar with the English language) 
assimilating to the Australian educational system.8 The significant coefficients for the third 
generation in the analysis of Year-12 qualifications sustain that interpretation: the third-plus 
generation were much less likely (by  some 18 percentage points) to have achieved that 
qualification level than the first generation – high school attainment regressed in the second 
generation compared with the first, and noticeably so in the third-plus.  But those differences 
are much weaker with regard to Tertiary qualifications, for which the only significant 
difference is 7 percentage points between the first and third generations 
 
The differences across the three age groups are generally much stronger than those across 
generations, and are also statistically significant. Older immigrants are much less likely 
(some 31 percentage points) than their younger counterparts to have proceeded further than 
the minimum school-leaving age and, complementing that, also less likely to have HSC or 
Tertiary qualifications. The smaller coefficients for the latter suggest, however, that those 
who do proceed beyond the statutory minimum age for education are more likely to proceed 
to a degree-level qualification. 
 
Further to these differences across the generations and age groups, the models’ second step, 
which introduces dummy variables to explore ancestry-group differences, indicates few 
substantial – let alone statistically significant – differences between the educational 
qualifications reported by immigrants from the UK and their contemporaries in the other nine 
groups. Only two – Chinese and Indians – were much more likely to have degree-level 
qualifications, holding age and generation constant (with the complementary smaller 
percentages having left school at the minimum age only); the Chinese, for example, were 
nearly 18 percentage points more likely to have a degree or similar qualification than those 
with a UK ancestry, holding age and generation constant.  Only the Lebanese Muslims were 
substantially and significantly less likely to have Tertiary-level qualifications than those from 
the UK. 
 
The results of these regressions indicate, therefore, that, holding constant age and 
generational variations, there were very few significant differences across the ten ancestry 
groups in their educational qualifications. The absence of any such differences means, 
therefore, that any variations in occupational attainment and income levels would not reflect 
inter-group differences in human capital. Significant age group and generational differences, 
however, especially the former, clearly suggest – in line with our second hypothesis – uneven 
convergence towards the overall pattern because of inter-ancestral group age and generational 
differences. And it is to those differences that we now turn. 
 
Economic integration I: occupations  
 
The preceding analyses have shown strong differences among Australia’s main immigrant 
groups in their educational qualifications according to age and generation, but only minimally 
                                                          
overlap, indicating that the latter is significantly larger than the former;  both are significantly 
different from zero. 
8 The large, negative coefficients for Chinese and Indians in the second step model for Year 
10 qualifications only suggests that they – as is widely observed – place a high premium on 
education and thus have assimilated more readily to the Australian system (as indicated by 
their positive coefficients for the higher-level qualifications). 
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for their ancestry. Does this also apply to their labour market situations? In particular, 
whereas there might be significant differences in occupational and income distributions 
across the age and generational groups, are there additional significant differences relating to 
ancestral background? A negative answer would imply that the process of economic 
integration into Australian society was not differentiated by immigrant origin; members of all 
groups – holding constant age and generation – are as equally likely to have prospered (or 
not). 
 
Table 4 shows the number of modelled logged observed:expected ratios for each occupation, 
generation and age group that were statistically significantly different from zero – either 
positively (>0) or negatively (<0): a positive ratio indicates more individuals in that cell than 
expected, and a negative ratio indicates fewer. The first block of data gives the number for 
each generation by age combination (the maximum possible in each cell, and each pair of 
cells for each occupation, is 10)9 and the two lower blocks give the separate sums for each 
generation and age group (with the maximum possible being 30).  
 
Several clear patterns can be discerned from the summary tables at the foot of each block. For 
example, most first-generation groups – irrespective of age and ancestry – were significantly 
under-represented in the two white-collar occupational groups (they have significant ratios in 
the <0 columns), and significantly over-represented in the two blue-collar groups and also 
among the unemployed (the >0 columns). Third-generation groups, on the other hand, were 
more likely to be over- than under-represented in the white-collar occupations, indicating a 
clear social mobility shift characteristic of economic integration by the immigrant groups. 
Across the age groups, there were clear differences between those aged 20-29, on the one 
hand, and those aged 50-69, on the other: the former are under-represented in the professional 
and semi- and un-skilled occupations, but over-represented in the other two occupational 
categories plus among the unemployed; those aged 50-69 show the reverse polarisation – 
over-represented in the occupational groups at the two ends of the status spectrum 
(professional and semi- and un-skilled) and under-represented in the other three. 
 
The overall picture from Table 4 is of very substantial differences across generational and age 
groups, therefore. For each row in the summary blocks there is a potential total of 150 
significant differences, either positive or negative. For the three generations there were 118, 
109 and 83 respectively, indicating that the great majority of differences by generation were 
significantly different from zero – but more so in the first generation than the third. Similarly, 
there were 117, 111 and 84 significant differences for the three age groups. For those longest-
established in Australia and the oldest among them, therefore, the number in each 
occupational group was more likely to be statistically similar to that for all groups as a whole, 
compared to the more recent arrivals and the youngest members. But the overall impression 
is that across the ancestry groups, the different age and generational groups had statistically 
significant different occupational distributions. 
 
Given that the majority of generational and age groups had occupational distributions 
significantly different from those expected, does this also imply significant differences 
among the ten ancestry groups within each generation and age group? Table 5 summarises 
the number of significant differences in each, recalling that from the discussion of the 
example in Table 2 the maximum number possible is nine. Only two of the 45 cells approach 
                                                          
9 For example, the sum of professions in the 1st generation aged 20-69 >0 is 6; the sum for 
age group 20-29 for all three generations >0 is 2. 
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that maximum: there are seven significant differences in the rank ordering of the ten groups 
among those aged 30-49 in the first generation for the semi-/un-skilled occupational group, 
and also six for the unemployed group. 
 
One conclusion stands out from this summary table, therefore: there was a clear generational 
gradation in the number of significant differences between pairs of immigrant groups, with 56 
(of a possible total of 135) in the first generation, 29 in the second, and just 6 in the third. The 
first generation had many more significant differences in the oldest two of the three age 
groups, whereas in the second they were concentrated in the younger two groups. But the 
dominant finding is that among third generation Australian immigrants there were very few 
significant differences across the ten ancestry groups studied here in their occupational 
distributions. Differences in the first generation had largely disappeared and – in Borjas’ 
terminology – there had been ‘regression toward the mean’; all groups had similar 
occupational distributions by the third generation; the melting-pot was working. 
 
What of the detailed rank ordering of the ten ancestry groups; are there any common 
patterns? The five columns on the left-hand side of Table 6 rank order the ten according to 
their modelled logged ratios for each of the five occupational groups among the first-
generation 30-49 year-olds; those with a negative ratio are shown in italics and those with a 
positive ratio in bold. The first column – for the professional and managerial occupations – 
has the UK and Irish with the largest positive ratios, indicating more in that occupational 
group than expected, whereas the four refugee groups – at the head of the column – have 
negative values, indicating fewer than expected. The reverse situation is shown for the semi- 
and un-skilled occupations; the Irish and UK immigrants again occupy one extreme of the 
ranking for unemployed persons, with the two Lebanese (but not Yugoslav) groups in two of 
the three lowest places. In general, therefore, the integration process for that generation and 
age group saw those from the UK and Ireland having moved in substantial numbers into the 
higher status occupations sooner than the Lebanese and Former Yugoslavs. As a consequence 
those with British Isles’ ancestry were under-represented and those from Lebanon and the 
Former Yugoslavia over-represented in the lower status occupations and among the 
unemployed. Those with Greek, Italian, Chinese and Indian ancestry occupied intermediate 
positions in most of the rankings, although the Greeks and Italians had the highest levels of 
over-representation in the clerical and sales occupational group – indicative of the segments 
of the labour market to which they gravitated within Australian towns and cities – and the 
Chinese and Indians were the most under-represented groups in the skilled blue-collar jobs. 
Again, therefore, the evidence points to the relevance of the melting-pot rather than the 
segmented/truncated assimilation models: all groups were moving in the same direction, 
though at different speeds. 
 
Economic integration II: incomes 
 
Table 7 replicates Table 4 for the analyses of income distributions. The number of ancestry 
groups with more rather than fewer than expected people in the lowest income category 
declined from the first to the third generation, for example, but increased slightly across the 
three age groups. Unsurprisingly, young people, and especially those in the first generation, 
were very unlikely to be over-represented in the highest income groups. Overall, there was an 
increase in the numbers earning low incomes between the first two generations followed by a 
decrease in the third; regarding the highest incomes, there was a slight increase between the 
first two generations. 
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As with the occupational distributions, there was a substantial number of statistically 
significant differences in income distributions by generation and age across the ten ancestry 
groups. Summaries of the number of significant differences at the foot of Table 7 also show 
that those significant differences were most prevalent among the first generation and young 
immigrants. Of the possible 150 significant differences there were 134 for the first 
generation, 118 for the second and 80 for the third; similarly, there were 125 for those aged 
20-29, 107 for those aged 30-49, and 100 for the oldest group. 
 
Table 8 replicates Table 5 with a summary of the number of significant differences between 
pairs of ancestral groups in the rank orderings of their logged ratios, by generation and age 
group. The same clear pattern emerges for incomes across the generations as for the 
occupational groups, with 44 significant differences in the first, 14 in the second, and just 5 in 
the third. Most of the significant differences in the first generation were in the older two age 
groups. 
 
The second block of five columns in Table 6, referring again to first-generation immigrants 
aged 30-49 but this time for the five income groups, provides a further set of clear rankings 
indicating the different pace of integration experienced by the various groups. Thus the 
Lebanese Christians, Lebanese Muslims and Former Yugoslav Muslims – but not the Former 
Yugoslav Christians (most of whose first-generation members arrived in Australia earlier 
than those in the other three groups) – have the highest levels of over-representation in the 
two low income groups and the highest levels of underrepresentation in the three higher 
income groups; those with UK and Irish ancestry are in the opposite situation –  
overrepresented in the higher and underrepresented in the lower income groups. Again, the 
various ancestry groups proceeded towards full integration at different rates. 
 
Full Integration? 
 
Borjas argued that if, by the third generation, the occupational and income distributions for 
immigrant groups had ‘regressed toward the mean’ , there should be at most only minimal 
differences between the two (immigrant and non-immigrant) population segments. Table 9 
addresses this, comparing the two distributions for all ten ancestry groups in the third 
generation, by age group, with those for the non-immigrant Australian population – those 
who did not claim an extra-Australian ancestry. 
 
The conclusion is very clear. Third-generation settlers in Australia scarcely differed from 
their host society in either their occupational or their income distributions, within each of the 
three age groups comprising the working-age population. The maximum percentage point 
difference in any pair of columns is just five – in the percentage aged 50-69 earning the 
lowest weekly incomes (with more Australians than immigrants in that category). There is 
only one four-point difference and there are four three-point differences. Of course, the third 
generation, as Table 1 showed, is dominated by those with UK and Irish ancestry, whose pace 
of integration has generally been greater than that of the other groups. It could be, therefore, 
that analyses in two or more decades time might falsify that conclusion, with third generation 
members of some ancestral groups having, for example, lower incomes than others. However, 
the results of the analyses reported in Tables 4-7, based on an analytical procedure that takes 
particular account of small numbers in some cells of a contingency table, do not support such 
an argument. Whatever the ancestral group, the second and, especially, third generations 
rarely differ significantly from each other in their occupational structures and income 
distributions. 
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Borjas further argued that inter-generational movement towards economic integration may 
not occur evenly across ethnic groups.  This is addressed in Table 10 which, for each ancestry 
group, excepting Lebanese Muslims because of lack of numbers, compares its occupational 
distribution with that of people nominating Australian ancestry.  Here, however, the third 
generation experience among ethnic groups in Australia indicates almost complete integration 
following the linear model, similar to the Canadian experience.  With only two exceptions, 
ethnic groups are above or close to the Australian norm in all occupational categories, with a 
general emphasis on white collar occupations, especially among the Irish and Lebanese 
Christians.  Among the two exceptions, Italians show less emphasis on managerial-
professional positions, but with a higher proportion in clerical-sales jobs.  The main variant is 
Lebanese Muslims who are relatively low in managerial-professional employment levels but 
above the Australian average in clerical-sales and technical-skilled positions. The stand-out 
difference for this group is its high rate of unemployment, however, reflecting more general 
concern about the social and economic integration of Muslims in Australia (Hassan, 2010).   
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has tested two hypotheses regarding the economic integration of different 
immigration groups in Australia. It has deployed an original, bespoke data set cross-
classifying the entire Australian workforce by age, generation and ancestry group, according 
to both their occupational and income distributions – with additional information on their 
educational qualifications. An innovative statistical procedure designed to identify the 
significant differences in such large contingency tables – containing 450 cells each, with very 
substantial variations in both the observed and expected cell values – has identified where 
there are major differences.    
 
The conclusions are clear and are in line with the melting-pot model; there is no evidence that 
members of any of the groups whose economic situations have been analysed here have 
experienced substantial disadvantages in their adaptation to the Australian labour market. 
Over three generations the economic circumstances of the selected immigrant groups in 
Australia have converged and become no different overall from those of Australians who 
claim no overseas ancestry. By the third generation there has been full economic (structural) 
integration across all ten of the ancestry groups studied. The pace of that integration has 
varied across the groups, and the analyses showed significant differences in their first and 
second generations in both their occupational structures and income distributions. 
Nevertheless, by the third generation there were very few significant differences between 
pairs of immigrant groups in their proportions in any one occupational or income category. 
The ten ancestry groups chosen here to reflect the four main waves of immigration to 
Australia, have converged on that common position at different rates, holding constant age 
and generation; in general, those with UK and Irish ancestries integrated at a faster rate than, 
say, those from Lebanon and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. Whatever the starting 
point, in terms of both occupation and incomes, non-immigrant and third-generation 
immigrant Australians form a homogeneous workforce.      
 
As has been widely noted, there are substantial differences between countries in the rates of 
immigrant economic integration – reflecting a combination of local social, economic and 
cultural circumstances plus the cultural and other characteristics of the migrant groups. The 
Australian experience may not be shared by other multi-cultural, multi-ethnic societies, 
therefore, but the analyses presented here have identified no clear evidence that some groups 
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have integrated more readily than others there. Those analyses have focused on only a 
selection of the many ancestral groups now resident in Australia, and further questions 
remain to be addressed – have there been differences within some if not all of the ancestry 
groups in the rates of economic integration between men and women, for example, and have 
those who live in the major cities had different experiences from those in the smaller towns 
and rural areas?10 The analyses presented here have provided a framework within which such 
questions can be addressed. Australia, from the available data, appears to be a classic 
‘melting-pot’. 
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10 One difficulty in addressing these questions is that, even though data are available for the 
entire population nevertheless given the size of the matrices – five generations and three age 
groups plus five occupational and five income groups – for each ancestry group the number 
of cells with small numbers of observations, and thus relatively unreliable estimates of 
observed:expected ratios can be quite large. Adding further classifications – male:female 
and/or city:urban:rural, for example – would rapidly exacerbate that problem. 
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Table 1. Generational and age structures of the ten ancestry groups in Australia – percentages 
of those in the workforce. 
 
 Generation Age Group Total 
 1st 2nd 3rd 20-29 30-49 50-69 . 
UK 16 8 76 19 46 35 3,019,079 
Ireland 8 4 88 20 45 35 507,027 
Greece 19 72 9 13 63 24 110,075 
Italy 18 57 25 19 52 29 273,199 
China 86 11 3 37 43 20 229,764 
India 95 4 1 39 52 9 177,045 
Fmr Yugoslavia Christian 51 47 2 18 56 26 90,554 
Fmr Yugoslavia Muslim 86 13 1 33 51 16 4,977 
Lebanon Christian 48 48 4 22 50 28 37,302 
Lebanon Muslim 52 47 1 38 51 11 18,079 
TOTAL 24 13 63 21 47 32 4,467,101 
 
20 
 
 
Table 2. Rank ordering of the ten ancestr7 groups according to their modelled ratios, for two 
generations, age groups and occupations 
 
 O E LowCI Ratio HighCI Sig 
Second generation, aged 20-29, Professional and Managerial 
Yugoslav Muslim 49 91 -0.71 -0.52 -0.34  
Lebanese Muslim 1,142 1,900 -0.53 -0.48 -0.44 N 
UK 14,240 20,263 -0.37 -0.35 -0.32 Y 
Yugoslav Christian 2,497 3,368 -0.31 -0.28 -0.24 Y 
Ireland 1,447 1,838 -0.26 -0.22 -0.17 N 
Lebanese Christian 1,926 2,305 -0.20 -0.16 -0.12 N  
Italy 4,234 4,978 -0.17 -0.14 -0.11 N 
Greece 2,479 2,845 -0.15 -0.11 -0.08 N 
India 1,644 1,470 0.09 0.13 0.18 Y 
China 9,105 7,438 0.20 0.22 0.25 Y 
First generation, aged 30-49, Semi- and Un-skilled 
Ireland 1,573 2,642 -0.54 -0.49 -0.45 
UK 22,632 34,048 -0.41 -0.38 -0.36 Y 
China 12,292 13,012 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 Y 
Italy 1,802 1,771 -0.00 0.04 0.08 Y 
India 13,289 12,372 0.06 0.09 0.12 N 
Greece 938 789 0.14 0.19 0.25 Y 
Lebanese Christian 1,277 1,074 0.14 0.19 0.24 N 
Lebanese Muslim 1,320 829 0.44 0.48 0.53 Y 
Yugoslav Christian 5,293 2,889 0.60 0.63 0.66 Y 
Yugoslav Muslim 577 257 0.76 0.82 0.88 Y  
 
Key: O – observed number; E – expected number; Ratio – the modelled ratio; LowCI – the 
lower credible interval; HighCI – the higher credible interval; Sig – whether the ratio is 
significantly different from that in the previous row (Y – Yes; N – No). 
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Table 3. Stepwise regression analyses of the percentage of individuals with the specified 
educational qualifications, showing regression coefficients and their standard errors  
 
Variable Year 10 Year 12 Tertiary 
Step: 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Constant 5.7  10.3 83.6 79.7 46.3 46.3  
   (1.7)  (2.6) (3.9) (6.1) (3.6) (4.5) 
Generation (comparator: First) 
Second 4.9  4.9 -2.0 -1.9 1.4 1.4 
 (1.9)  (1.7) (4.3) (4.1) (3.9) (3.0) 
Third 13.1  13.2 -17.9 -18.3 -4.2 -7.4 
 (1.9)  (1.8) (4.4) (4.1) (4.2) (3.2) 
Age group (comparator: 20-29) 
30-49 5.7  5.7 -11.1 -11.1 -7.8 -7.8 
 (1.9)  (1.7) (4.3) (4.0) (4.0) (3.0) 
50-69 13.2   13.3 -30.5 -30.9 -19.2 -20.8  
 (1.9)   (1.8) (4.4) (4.2) (4.1) (3.2) 
Ancestry (comparator: UK) 
Irish   -4.2(3.1)  -0.7(7.2)  7.0(5.3) 
Greek   -9.5(3.1)  5.3(7.2)  0.1(5.3) 
Italian   -0.4(3.1)  -4.1(7.2)  -1.5(5.3) 
Yugoslav Christian   -5.4(3.1)  7.8(7.2) -11.0(6.1) 
Yugoslav Muslim   -5.1(4.0)  6.0(9.3) -10.0(6.9) 
Chinese -10.5(3.1) 16.2(7.2) 17.9(5.4) 
Indian   -6.6(3.1) 12.8(7.2) 14.6(5.4) 
Lebanese Christian   -3.5(3.1)  7.7(7.2)  2.4(5.4) 
Lebanese Muslim   -1.2(3.2)  -9.9(7.5) -17.6(5.5) 
R2 0.52      0.60 0.44 0.51 0.20 0.54 
 
Note: Statistically significant coefficients at the 0.05 level or better are shown in bold.  
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Table 4. Number of ancestry groups in each generation and age group with statistically 
significant modelled logged ratios greater than and less than zero in the five occupational 
categories. 
 
 Occupation 
Generation/           Professional Clerical Technical S/Unskilled Unemployed 
Age Group >0 <0 >0 <0 >0 <0 >0 <0 >0 <0 
1 20-29 0 10 5 3 7 2 4 4 9 0 
 30-49 3 6 0 7 8 2 6 3 7 3 
 50-69 3 7 1 9 7 1 7 1 4 5 
2 20-29 2 8 10 0 7 2 0 9 8 1 
 30-49 6 2 5 4 5 3 1 6 2 5 
 50-69 6 0 5 0 0 8 2 3 2 6 
3 20-29 0 7 7 0 6 0 1 7 6 0 
 30-49 6 1 0 1 1 2 1 4 2 5 
 50-69 6 0 1 0 0 6 3 3 0 4 
Sum – Generations 
1  6 23 6 19 22 5 17 8 20 8 
2  14 10 20 4 12 13 3 18 12 12 
3  12 8 8 1 7 8 5 14 8 9 
Sum – Age Groups 
 20-29 2 25 22 3 20 4 5 20 23 1 
 30-49 15 9 5 12 14 7 8 13 11 13 
 50-69 15 7 7 9 7 15 12 7 6 15 
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Table 5. Number of statistically significant differences between adjacent pairs of ancestry 
groups in their modelled logged ratios, by generation, age group and occupational category 
 
Generation  1   2   3 
Age Group 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Managerial/Professional 1 4 5 4 2 1 0 0 1 
Clerical/Sales 1 3 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Technicians/Skilled Trades 3 4 4 1 2 1 0 0 0 
Semi- and Unskilled 2 7 5 4 5 1 1 1 0 
Unemployed 4 6 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 
 
Key to age groups: 1 – 20-29; 2 – 30-49; 3 – 50-69. 
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Table 6. Rank ordering of the ten ancestry groups according to their modelled logged ratios 
for the five occupational and income groups: those in the first generation aged 30-49 
(negative ratios are shown in italics and positive ratios in bold) 
 
 Occupation Income Group 
  PM CS Te SU Un 200 400 800 1250 2000 
 1 YM LM In Ir Ir Ir Ir LM LM LM 
 2 LM Ir Ch UK UK In  UK LC YM YM 
 3 YC YM Gr Ch It UK In YM LC LC 
 4 LC In UK It YC It YC UK It Ch  
 5 Gr Ch YC In YM YC It Ir Ch YC 
 6 It LC It Gr Gr Ch Gr Gr YC It 
 7 Ch YC Ir LC Ch Gr Ch Ch In Gr 
 8 In UK LC LM LC LC YM In UK In 
 9 UK It YM YC In YM LC YC Ir UK 
 10 Ir Gr LM YM LM LM LM It Gr Ir 
 
Key 
Occupations: PM – professional and managerial; CS – clerical and sales; Te – technical; SU – 
semi- and un-skilled; Un – unemployed. 
Income groups: 200 – A$200-399; 400 – A$400-799; 800 – A$ 800-1,249; 1250 – A$1,250-
1,999; 2000 – A$2,000<. 
Immigrant groups: UK – United Kingdom; Ir – Ireland; Gr – Greece; It – Italy; Ch – China; 
In – India; YC – Former Yugoslav Christians; YM – Former Yugoslav Muslims; LC – 
Lebanese Christians; LM – Lebanese Muslims. 
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Table 7. Number of ancestry groups in each generation and age group with statistically 
significant modelled logged ratios greater than and less than zero in the five income groups. 
 
 Income 
Generation/ $200-399 $400-799 $800-1,249 $1,250-1,999 $2,000< 
Age Group >0 <0 >0 <0 >0 <0 >0 <0 >0 <0 
1 20-29 1 6 9 1 5 1 1 5 0 9 
 30-49 2 7 8 2 4 2 4 3 3 5 
 50-69 6 3 7 1 1 8 0 6 2 6 
2 20-29 1 7 10 0 8 1 0 8 0 10 
 30-49 0 9 6 2 4 3 7 1 8 2 
 50-69 1 6 7 0 0 2 0 2 3 1 
3 20-29 0 7 7 0 6 0 0 6 0 8 
 30-49 1 6 3 1 3 0 6 1 7 1 
 50-69 0 6 3 0 0 2 0 3 4 2 
Sum – Generations 
1  9 16 24 4 10 11 5 14 5 20 
2  2 22 23 2 12 6 7 11 11 13  
3  1 19 13 1 9 2 6 10 11 11 
Sum – Age Groups 
 20-29 2 20 26 1 19 2 1 19 0 27 
 30-49 3 22 17 5 11 5 17 5 18 8 
 50-69 7 15 17 1 1 12 0 11 9 9 
 
26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Number of statistically significant differences between adjacent pairs of ancestry 
groups in their modelled logged ratios, by generation, age group and income group 
 
Generation  1   2   3 
Age Group 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
A$200-399 3 4 5 1 1 1 0 0 1 
A$400-799 1 3 3 1 2 1 0 1 0 
A$800-1,249 2 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A$1,250-1,999 0 4 3 0 2 1 1 0 1 
A$2,000< 0 4 5 1 3 0 0 1 0 
 
Key to age groups: 1 – 20-29; 2 – 30-49; 3 – 50-69. 
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Table 9. Occupational and income distributions (percentages of column totals) of third-
generation ancestral and non-ancestral Australians, by age group. 
 
 20-29 30-49 50-69      
 Im Aus Im Aus Im Aus 
Occupation 
Managerial/Professional 26 23 38 35 39 35 
Clerical/Sales 36 36 31 31 31 32 
Technicians/skilled trades 18 20 13 14 11 11 
Semi- and Un-skilled 13 14 14 16 16 19  
Unemployed 6 7 4 4 3 3 
Income 
A$200-399 19 20 13 15 23 28  
A$400-799 36 37 26 26 28 29 
A$800-1,249 29 28 25 25 22 20 
A$1,250-1,999 14 13 23 23 18 15  
A$2000< 3 3 13 12 10 8 
 
Im – immigrant groups; Aus – Australian ancestry 
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Table 10. Occupational (percentages of row totals) of third-generation non-ancestral 
Australians, all age groups 
 
 Occupation Group 
Ancestry            Man/Prof    Cler/Sal   Tech/Skill   Semi/Unskill   Unemploy 
Australian                 31.9           32.6           14.8               16.2               4.5 
British                 33.4           33.2           13.6               15.0               4.8 
Irish                 38.6           36.3             8.1               12.5               4.7 
Greek                 32.1           32.4           14.5               16.3               4.8        
Italian                            26.7           38.6           16.1               12.9               5.8 
Chinese                            36.4           32.1           10.0               17.5               4.0 
Indian                            31.8           34.0           13.5               15.1               5.6 
Fmr Yugo. (Christian)          34.1           35.8           18.1               10.7               3.2 
Lebanese (Christian)    38.4           36.8           12.3                 7.0               5.5 
Lebanese (Muslim)    22.7           39.8           18.7               11.4               7.3 
 
Note: Muslins from the former Yugoslavia were excluded for lack of 3rd generation numbers. 
 
 
